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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 20608 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented in this appeal that requires 
consideration by the Court is whether the trial court erred in 
ordering that trial proceed without defendant present. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert Glen Houtz, was charged with two 
counts of automobile homicide, a third degree felony, under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (1978) (amended 1985); two counts of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, a 
class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(1) and (3) 
(Supp. 1985); leaving the scene of an accident involving personal 
injury or death, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-6-29 (Supp. 1985); leaving the scene of an accident 
involving damage to a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 41-6-30 (1981); and failure to report an accident, a 
class B misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-34 (1981) (R. 2-
4). After a trial, at which defendant was not present, the jury 
returned verdicts of guilty on all charges (R. 91-7). The trial 
court then sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for the 
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following terms: two consecutive terms of zero to five years for 
the automobile homicide convictions, two concurrent terms of 364 
days for driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing 
bodily injury to be served consecutively to the automobile 
homicide sentences, and a term of 364 days for leaving the scene 
of an accident that resulted in death or injury to run 
concurrently with the sentence imposed for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. No 
additional sentences were imposed for leaving the scene of an 
accident and failure to report an accident. The trial court 
further ordered that defendant pay a fine of $5,000 for the 
automobile homicide convictions and restitution to the victims in 
the amount of $7,673.70 (R. 114-8). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case came before the trial court on February 25, 
1985, but was set for trial on the following day because 
defendant was not present. On the morning of the 26th, defendant 
again failed to appear, and the trial court, unwilling to proceed 
with a non-jury trial—which defense counsel indicated defendant 
desired—without an in-court waiver of the jury by defendant 
himself, set the trial over another day (Transcript of Feb. 26, 
1985 at 2, 8-10). On the 27th, defendant, for the third time, 
failed to appear for trial. Defense counsel indicated to the 
court that he had spoken with defendant on February 23 and 
informed him of his February 26th trial date. He then told the 
court that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on the 26th, the 
prosecutor received word that defendant had been incarcerated on 
-2-
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February 25 in San Diego, Califonia on a drunk driving charge. 
Neither of the parties could say whether defendant had posted the 
$750 bail set for that charge or been released on other terms. 
It was also noted that defendant had agreed to remain in Salt 
Lake County as a condition to a pretrial bail reduction in the 
Beaver County case. Based upon these representations, which were 
not in dispute, defendant's counsel moved for a continuance of 
trial until defendant could return from San Diego and appear at 
trial. After summarizing the facts before it, the trial court 
denied this motion and ordered that trial proceed without 
defendant. The court specifically ruled that defendant's absence 
from trial was voluntary and without good cause (Transcript of 
Feb. 27, 1985 at 16-24; Addendum). 
Subsequently, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on 
all the charges against defendant. On March 1, 19 85, defendant 
waived extradition from San Diego County to Utah (R. 43). He was 
voluntarily present for sentencing in the trial court seventeen 
days later (R. 115). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under federal and Utah law, a criminal defendant has 
the right to be present at trial. Although that right may be 
waived by the defendant's voluntary absence, the trial court in 
the instant case had before it insufficient information upon 
which to rule that defendant was voluntarily absent on the date 
of his trial. Because it had information that defendant was 
probably incarcerated in San Diego, California on the day of 
trial, the trial court improperly ordered that trial proceed 
-3-
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without him. With tha t information, the court simply could not 
have safely assumed that defendant 's absence was voluntary. 
Accordingly, defendant 's convictions should be reversed and h is 
case remanded for a new t r i a l . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE IT APPEARS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT 
TRIAL, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND 
THE CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Art i c l e I § 12 of the Utah Const i tut ion s t a t e s tha t 
" t i l n criminal prosecutions the accused shal l have the r ight to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ." This r igh t 
i s codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6 (1982). A s imilar r ight 
i s afforded under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United Sta tes C o n s t i t u t i o n ) I l l i n o i s v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 
(1970); S ta te v. GlennfrL#56 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982). However, 
the r ight to be present a t t r i a l i s a personal r ight which may be 
waived by a defendant. Glenny. 656 P.2d a t 992. This i s 
codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1982), which provides in 
per t inent pa r t : 
(a) In a l l cases the defendant sha l l have the 
r ight to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel. The defendant sha l l be personally 
present a t the t r i a l with the following 
exceptions: 
ik\ • • • iV/(2) in prosecutions for offenses not 
^ punishable by death, the defendant 's 
voluntary absence from t r i a l af ter notice to 
defendant of the time for t r i a l shal l not
 f 
prevent the case from being t r i e d and a 
verd ic t or judgment entered therein sha l l 
have the same effect as if defendant had been 
p resen t ! . ] [Emphasis added.] 
- 4 -
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A voluntary waiver may be es tabl ished by the conduct or words of 
the defendant, but i t i s the S t a t e ' s burden to e s t ab l i sh tha t the 
waiver i s voluntary. £ee_ State v. Ross. 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah P ^ 
1982). ^&3^^r**^ ^ ^ ^ / a ^ ^ m^-r,^ 
The question presented in the instant case is whether 
the trial court correctly ruled that defendant's absence from 
trial was voluntary and that trial could therefore proceed 
without him. The court ruled this way even though it had before 
it undisputed information that defendant had been incarcerated in 
San Diego two days before trial and nothing to indicate that 
defendant was not still incarcerated on the days trial proceeded 
in his absence. Under these circumstances, it appears the court 
had insufficient information upon which to base its conclusion 
that defendant's absence was voluntary and without good cause. 
The court simply could not have safely assumed that defendant was 
no longer incarcerated at the time of trial, or that he had 
voluntarily waived his right to be present. Defendant's waiver 
of extradition from San Diego County on March lf 1985 and his 
court appearance in Utah on March 18 for sentencing weighs 
against the validity of such an assumption. Furthermore, 
defendant's presence in San Diego on February 25 would not in 
itself, setting aside the question of incarceration, have made it 
impossible for him to have attended trial in Utah on either that 
day or the 26th, and thus render his absence voluntary. It being 
clear that, when a defendant is in custody, the trial court has a 
duty to see that he is personally present at every stage of 
trial, State v. Aikers. 87 Utah 507, 515, 51 P.2d 1052, 1056 
-5-
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(1935) , the court heref which in all fairness had to assume that 
defendant was still incarcerated in San Diego on the date of 
trial, erred when it ordered that trial proceed without him 
present. Given the information available, the court could not 
reasonably determine that defendant's absence was voluntary.1 
See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (noting, in 
dictum, that a defendant in custodyjdoes not have the power to 
waive his right to be present) ; State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473 
(Ut§h 1984); United States v. Crutcher. 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d 
Cir. 1968), ££i± ££ni£Ld, 394 U.S. 908 (1969) (holding that an 
incarcerated defendant who gave a false name upon arrest had not 
knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial 
on another matter). Cf. State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Myers. 29 Utah 2d 254, 508 P.2d 41 (1973). Accordingly, 
/ / 
it appears that defendant is entitled/to reversals of his 
convictions and a remand of his case for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 5 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the Court should 
reverse defendant's convictions and remand the case for a new 
trial. \ l> Qui*** 
e* 
oJ^ * 
1
 That defendant may have violated a condition for his pretrial 
reduction of bail by traveling to San Diego does not alter this 
conclusion. 
-6-
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RESPECTFULLY submit ted t h i s _ L 2 Z 7 day of Janua ry , 
1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t four t r ue and exac t copies of t he 
foregoing Brief were mai led , pos tage p r e p a i d , to Leo G. Kane l l , 
At torney for A p p e l l a n t , 157 South Main S t r e e t , P.O. Box 735, 
Mil ford , Utah 84751, t h i s /5^day of J anua ry , 1986. 
^Q~a^c^L dj-^^tfu &?H*^-3^u»-
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the trial can go forward if the penalty is not death, which 
it is not in this case. 
The second requirement is that the defendant must 
have received notice of the trial setting. And that is 
clear that he did in this case. Those are the two 
requirements. 
I might mentionr if it is an analogy, I'm not sure 
it is, in the bail forfeiture statute -- chapter, it says\ 
that a bail forfeiture may be set aside if the defendant 
cannot appear. However, it may not be set aside if the 
reason for his non-appearance was that he was in detention 
in military or civil authorities. And that seems to be 
the case here. If that's an analogy, then it would apply. 
I do resist the motion. 
THE COURT: Rebuttal? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I don't know whether 
it's appropriate or inappropriate analogy, but it seems 
to me that I ought not to be put in the peculiar position 
of asking for the issuance of a warrant. And he hasn't 
asked and you haven't taken the initiative to do that. 
But I don't suppose at this juncture it would be inappro-
priate to ask that it be done. And I think somebody from 
law enforcement ought to confirm whether he's in San Diego. 
And then I think we ought to find out if he would waive 
extradition, and if so, he could be brought back here. 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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There's nothing wrong with admonishing this jury and 
at least trying the case when he's present. 
Now, admittedly, the rules have slacked up substantially 
But I don't think anybody in this room questions what we 
are doing. It's just about as unique as any procedure that 
I've been involved with, and I think that it's the first 
time it's been done in the state. And I think more effort 
ought to be made by the Court to see if that man can be 
here. That's all I'm suggesting. 
I don't like running back and forth from Salt Lake 
and Beaver either but — 
THE COURT: I love it. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I don't want to end up trying 
the case a second or third time, at least a second. I 
don't know why we can't confirm that he's there and 
available. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: All right, the matter having been 
submitted to the Court, and I take it, Mr. Van Sciver, 
what you are really doing is renewing your motion for 
a continuance? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I am. 
THE COURT: And the Court held that yesterday 
after you made it, until you had an opportunity to further 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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supplement it with whatever you wanted in the record. 
And I take it the record is now full on that issue. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: It is. 
THE COURT: All right, the first ground, as 
I understand it, is because counsel for the defendant has 
only had the opportunity of personally interviewing his 
client, Robert Glen Houtz, one half-hour period with 
respect to the facts and circumstances and the defense 
in this case. Do I correctly state that? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: You do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And in addition to that, counsel has 
pointed out to the Court that he, as counsel for the 
defendant, is under a serious disability by reason of the 
absence of the defendant. Do I state that correctly? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: You do. 
THE COURT: And as a further reason, counsel 
for the defendant submits to the Court that as of ten 
o'clock last evening, the whereabouts of the defendant 
has been, at least in some manner, determined by the. 
Beaver County Sheriff's Department as being incarcerated 
in San Diego City, State of California, under a charge 
of driving under the influence, bail set, the best hearsay, 
at $7 50. Do I state that correctly? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's correct, your Honor. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: That is. 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Now, then, the Court 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
ID 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2D 
21 i 
22 ! 
23 | 
24 
25 
having listened to the argument of respective counsel and 
having reviewed the file and the file revealing (1) that 
the Information was filed in this Court on or about Septembe^ 
14, 1984, and that counsel -- let's see, he was arraigned 
on September 17, 1984, wherein a plea of not guilty on 
all counts was entered. The bail had been set, as I 
review it, in the amount of $100,000, and not posted; and 
that an application was made, to this Court, by a motion, 
with a mailing certificate 28th day of September, 1984, 
over the signature of instant counsel, Mr. Robert Van Sciverj 
and I should say that the record shows that Mr. Leo Kanell, 
an attorney licensed and practicing in the State of Utah 
and charged with Beaver County's counsel for those who 
are determined indigent, on some basis appeared at 
arraignment. Did he represent him at the preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Christiansen? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, he did, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Kanell having repre-
sented the accused at preliminary hearing; and the Court 
having reviewed the motion to reduce bail, over the signa-
ture of Robert Van Sciver, attorney for the defendant, 
and that motion to reduce bail having been supported by an 
affidavit of Mr. Robert Van Sciver, setting forth (1) "I 
am the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled j 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. J.9 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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matter and as such have personal knowledge of the defendant. 
(2) "The defendant is presently being held in the 
Beaver County Jail on a $100,000 bond and charged with 
two counts of automobile homicide, third-degree felonies. 
(3) "In spite of the transitory appearance of the 
defendant, he has lived in the Salt Lake valley for 20 
years, has been employed as a businessman in the Salt Lake 
valley for the same period of time, and is the father of 
six children. 
(4) "A high probability exists that the defendant 
will not be convicted as charged. 
(5) "As a condition of bail, the defendant would 
consent to remain in Salt Lake County, living with his 
son, Greg Houtz, who has adequate physical facilities to 
provide him housing. He will also be afforded opportunities 
for employment. 
(6) "Because of congested trial calendars and 
because of the complex nature of what appear to be a 
circumstantial case, the defendant should be made available 
to assist counsel with his case through bail, and adequate 
time to prepare cannot be afforded within the time permitted 
by law when one is in custody. 
Dated this 28th day of September, 1984," over the 
signature of Robert Van Sciver, attorney for the defendant. 
On that basis, this Court reduced the bail to $15,000 cash 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 20 
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6 
1 or appropriate and approved corporate surety. And that 
2 1 was signed by myself, as District Judge, on the 25th day 
3 of October, 1984. 
4 The record should show that Mr. Robert Van Sciver 
5 J is an attorney, this Court will take judicial knowledge 
of this, who has considerable reputation in trial work 
7 I not only in the State of Utah but in sister and neighboring 
B states. And this Court, on the basis of the affidavit, 
9
 I by an officer of the Court, who I have due respect for, 
and on those representations I reduced the bail to afford 
an opportunity to prepare for trial. 
12
 J Now, the minute entry will further show, or the 
131
 record will further show, that trial was originally set, 
14
 I over the signature of Sheila G. Rose, Trial Court 
15 
ID 
11 
16 
17 
IB 
19 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Executive, on the 27th of December, 1984, and a mailing 
certificate on the same day to Mr. Robert Van Sciver. 
That notice shows that the trial was reset for the 
25th day of February, 198 5 beginning at ten o'clock 
a.m. in this courtroom, Beaver County Courthouse, Beaver, 
2 D
 I Utah 
21 
The Court, by reason of a telephone conversation 
with Mr. Van Sciver, who advised the Court that the 
defendant and accused intended to waive a jury, and the 
Court, on the 25th of February, 1985, having a jury already 
summoned to come in to try two jury cases; and again upon 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 2 1 
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the representation of counsel, an officer of the Court, 
this Court changed the sequence of trials and tried another 
jury matter on Monday, setting this matter on Tuesday, the 
26th of February, to follow the jury trial, so that the 
summoning of the jury and the expense would come to some 
beneficial effect. 
The Court agreed to allow counsel for the defendant 
and the defendant to appear on the 26th for trial and at 
that time to waive the jury, after being advised by this 
Court of what he was doing and the circumstances surrounding 
his waiving a constitutional act. And I told counsel that 
I would require it to be in writing, signed in Court at 
that time, after inquiry. 
Yesterday morning, at the time of trial, Mr* Van 
Sciver appeared but the defendant did not. At that time 
Mr. Van Sciver advised the Court that he had only had 
one half hour-conference with the defendant from the entry 
of his counsel of record in September of 1984 until the 
instant date, to-wit, February 25, 1985. 
Now, then, while counsel for the defendant was 
present, the defendant was not. Without the defendant's 
presence, the Court would not and could, under the law, 
proceed with trial without a jury, because the Constitution 
of the United States and the Constitution of this state 
provide with emphasis that an accused has the right to be 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N , JR. 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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present, with certain limited exceptions; he has the right 
to a trial by juryr unless he knowingly and after advice 
waives that in open court. And I required it to be in 
writing, so that the record is clear. 
Therefore, the Court could not proceed with trial, 
and finding the grounds that counsel made for a continuance 
not effectively, not sufficient, held the motion until 
today to allow Mr. Van Sciver to further supplement the 
motion with facts or law; and the Court having been advised 
by Mr. Van Sciver that he talked to the defendant on 
Saturday, the 23rd of February -- and, now, I take it that 
that was by telephone? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: It was, your Honor. And I 
inquired where he was and he said Salt Lake County. 
THE COURT: All right. And the Court further 
having released him on a reduced bail with the under-
standing that he would reside in the Salt Lake County 
area and be available for preparation; and the Court 
finding that he has violated that condition and that the 
Court would find the fact that Mr. Van Sciver has not 
had an opportunity to talk to him more than one-half 
hour is by cause and fault of the defendant and not Mr. 
Van Sciver; and that he has absented himself from this 
area on the day of trial set and that he had knowledge of 
that, and this Court finds that it is voluntary and without 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR . 
CERTIF IED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
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good cause, and the motion for continuance is denied. 
Mr, Christiansen, do you have anything further in 
the record? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Nothing further on that 
matter, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Van Sciver, do you have anything 
further to go in the record on that matter? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Wefre going to make the 
defense lawyer ask for the warrant after all, is that 
what it comes down to? 
THE COURT: Well, we1re not — I'll discuss 
that with you in chambers. I have no problem at all in 
ordering a warrant for the arrest and if necessary the 
extradition of the defendant. We're going to go forward 
with this trial. That's the order. 
Now, anything further, Mr. Christiansen? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Not on that matter, your 
Honor. I do — 
THE COURT: Mr. Van Sciver? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Nothing. 
THE COURT: All right, now, Mr. Van Sciver, 
do you have any other motions? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I have none. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christiansen? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, I have a motion, your 
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